Security course 30 April 2018
- ACL
- Access Control List.
- Access Control
- who can access which parts of a system, by assigning permissions to roles, users to groups, and roles to groups.
- Authentication
- confirmation of identity.
- Authorisation
- access control.
- NZISS
- New Zealand Internet Security Standard
Restrict database access to only the tables required, use a minimum of stored procedures to hide sensitive tables entirely (e.g. an AUTHENTICATE() stored procedure, and no access to the USER table.
CREATE FUNCTION AUTHENTICATE(u TEXT, p TEXT) RETURNS TABLE (username TEXT, property1, TEXT, ...) AS $$ BEGIN SELECT username, property1, ... FROM users WHERE username = u, password = CRYPT(p); END; $$ LANGUAGE plpgsql;
- Design software to use the lowest privilege level required to complete its tasks.
- Deny access by default.
- Check return values of all system calls.
- Validate all inputs - lengths, field types, ranges, controlled vocabularies.
Authentication
- User IDs - users must be unique. No shared 'office admin' accounts with naff passwords.
- Don't use shit passwords. Enforce minimum password complexity, use multi-factor auth, biometrics, etc.
- Encrypt user authentication data over the network (including database connections).
- Don't store passwords in clear text.
- Password management policies - e.g. time-out or reset request after x attempts, lock account after y attempts.
- Display when a user last logged in.
Auditing
Log at least these events. We need who did what, where (source IP, device ID, etc.), and when:
- User logins.
- Privileged operations e.g. create new user, role/permissions changes, etc.
- failed attempts to elevate privileges.
- failed attempts to access files, functions, services. (Was it temporarily down, or was it attacked?)
- Security-related alerts and failures.
DON'T IMPLEMENT YOUR OWN CRYPTO unless you are a professional cryptologist implementing a software cryptography library.
Input handling
Never trust anything passed in, including the URL and its parameters, HTML form data, cookie values, request headers, without validating/sanitising them.
Output handling
- Use appropriate URL encoding (/ = %2f) and HTML encoding (& = &)
- Use HTTPS Strict Transport Security, Content Security Policy, and HTML frame options.
OWASP
Open Web Application Security Project. Freely available information, cheat sheets and guidelines, including:
- The OWASP Top Ten.
- Secure Coding Quick Reference Guide
- Zed Attack Proxy (ZAP)
Injection
Not just SQL. NoSQL, XML, serialisation, etc. Routers sometimes let you inject shell commands. Havoc ensues:
ping $input
Allows for
google.com; cat /etc/passwd
Broken Authentication
Credentials not protected when stored or transmitted, or can be guessed, or overwritten. Fun with badly handled session IDs, exposed in URLs, stored plain-text in cookies, not regenerated after login, not expired on logout. Timing attack on authentication queries and other requests can give a true/false verification and can figure out database structure (e.g. true takes longer, false fails immediately), etc.
Prevention
- Don't reinvent your wheels, use a well-supported mature web framework to handle auth/authz, sessions, etc.
- Use multi-factor authentication.
- Disable default accounts, change default passwords.
- Use a sensible password policy. Check for weak/naff passwords, show a strength indicator.
- Limit or tar-pit failed auth attempts.
- Detect/prevent account enumeration attacks on account profile, registration, recovery pages.
- Use random/hashed session IDs, use 'secure' and 'httpOnly' session cookies.
- HTTPS by default everywhere. With free LetsEncrypt certificates there's very little excuse in 2018.
Telling browsers not to cache input field values: autocomplete="off" great for card details, but in a password field, blocks password managers. So HTML5 allows password managers to override page instructions, so browsers started ignoring autocomplete for password fields.
Sensitive data exposure
- Transmitted in clear-text over a network.
- Old or weak ciphers, in light of Moore's law.
- Improper leakage through incorrect ACLs or authorisation.
- Not encrypted in storage, database, on disk.
Prevention
- Use encryption!
- Use the Mozilla SSL configuration generator
- Use strong encryption!
- Click "modern"
- Use ACLs!
- Delete temporary or ephemeral data, and data that's no longer required. Don't cache sensitive data on the client.
- Safely store and handle encryption keys.
Government approved cryptography
- Symmetric algo: AES, minimum 256 bit keys.
- Hashing algo: SHA2, 256, 384, 512 bits.
- Asymmetric PK algo: Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH), Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA).